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I. INTRODUCTION! !!
What is the Internal Conflict?!!
! For more than 40 years Colombia has been fighting a war with drugs. Each 
President has made immense efforts to slow the process of drug trafficking. 
However without international help Colombia’s society as a whole has been 
suffering from the consequences of illegal drug trafficking and illegal drug 
cultivation. Take for example the internal conflict that has brought nothing but 
chaos and violence to the Colombian society. For years Colombia has been 
experiencing internal conflict due to issues related to drugs, such as land 
displacement, absence of formal government regulations, and misallocation of 
resources and capital. Colombia’s internal conflict is extremely complex because 
a majority of the violence stems from the armed conflict between the government 
and two guerrilla groups. The oldest and largest leftists guerrilla group known as 
the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC) was founded in 1966, 
although their roots stem further back. Also the second oldest and largest leftists 
guerrilla group in Colombia is known as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and 
they were founded in the 1960s as well following the civil war known as la 
Violencia. During la Violencia the FARC was manifested out of rural self-defense 
groups which were organized by the main Colombian Communists Party. As for 
the ELN, the guerrilla movement group was organized by students, who all 
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focused on making an impact on the oil industry by blowing up pipelines and 
kidnapping oil executives for ransom.  !1
! Both guerrilla movement groups sought to make an impact in Colombian 
politics. The FARC made an impact by orchestrating a cease-fire when members 
of its winning political party, known as Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union), were 
murdered by paramilitary groups. This ultimately eliminated the Patriotic Union as 
a viable party and as a result the FARC responded with violence in retaliation. 
The war got worst and the FARC refused to lay down its arms. Negotiations 
between the different presidents of Colombia and both guerrilla groups (FARC 
and ELN) continued over the years, as the groups fought the government for a 
fuller agenda of social and economic reforms. Following this further, during the 
1980s and 1990s the violence became more intense and the internal conflict 
became more complex. According to William LeoGrande and Kenneth Sharpe in 
Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia's New ‘Violencia’, both 
authors write that the “Intensification of the war was fueled by revenue from the 
drug trade. Estimates of how much money the FARC raises from taxing drug 
production and commerce in its zones of control vary enormously, from a low of 
about $100 million a year to a high of $500 million. Regardless of the amount, 
there is no doubt drug revenue has enabled the FARC to significantly expand its 
ranks, increase its firepower, and extend its area of operations.”  For instance, 2
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 William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, 1
and Colombia's New 'Violencia,'" World Policy Journal 17, no. 3 (Fall 2000): [Page 3], 
accessed December 20, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209699.
Ibid,. 4.2
LeoGrande and Sharpe attests that in 1986 the FARC had grown to about 9,000 
operating combatants on twenty-seven different ‘fronts’. It is important to note 
that these operating combatants were local self-supporting and semi-
autonomous units. By 1999, the FARC had about 15,000 operating combatants 
on about sixty different fronts and they also were active in about 40% of 
Colombia’s municipalities. As a result, the FARC has successfully defeated the 
Colombian army and the internal conflict has started to reach neighboring 
countries.  According to Brandi James in her piece titled Examining the Impact of 3
Illicit Crop Eradication on Education in Colombia the FARC gained strength in 
rural Colombia as the organization began to grow immensely. Once they gained 
the appropriate strength in rural Colombia, the FARC began to demand what they 
considered “revolutionary taxes” from landowners. This demand fueled the war 
on drugs because it intensified the internal conflict and extended it between rural 
land owners and FARC insurgents. From that point on, mainly beginning in the 
1980s, many Colombians involved in the drug business began buying up all the 
land in the rural areas. As a result,  wars erupted because narco-landowners 
began recruiting paramilitaries to rid the areas of guerrilla influence. The 
landowners used their paramilitary groups to expel communities from areas 
where landowners would have liked to graze cattle or expand crop plantation. 
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 Ibid. 3
Most of these private paramilitary groups received tacit and or overt support from 
the Colombian military. !4
! As the FARC forces continued to grow the drug industry in Colombia 
continued to grow as well making the FARC a powerful force in Colombia’s 
society. Desperate for solutions the Colombian government realized their solution 
to calming the violence would come from ending the government’s war on drugs. 
However, the Colombian government suffered from lack of funds and as as result 
would have to rely on the international community to help solve its domestic 
issue. Thus, in 1999 Plan Colombia was introduced by the Colombian 
government in hopes that U.S. involvement could end the expansion of the drug 
industry.!
!
What is Plan Colombia?!!
! In 2000, the Clinton administration passed a bill that allowed the United 
States to help the Colombian government by sending them a $1 billion counter-
narcotics aid package. Plan Colombia was created by the Colombian 
government and made the request that other nation states aid them financially in 
their war against drug trafficking in the Americas. Although the plan called for 
$7.5 billion the Colombian government was only able to obtain $1.5 billion. When 
the plan was derived Colombia had undergone elections for their new president 
and at that time civil society was suffering from economic repression, a debt and 
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 Brandi James, "Examining the Impact of Illicit Crop Eradication on Education in 4
Colombia," Education in Emergencies & Post-Conflict Situations: Problems, Responses, 
& Possibilities 2 (Spring 2005): [Page 50].
unemployment crisis, and escalating violence and insecurity. Plan Colombia was 
considered a mechanism that focused on promoting peace, prosperity, 
democratization, and consolidation. Plan Colombia had a few main foci, such as 
the economic strategy, the peace process, the anti-narcotic strategy, 
strengthening of the state, and social development.  Thus, the tangible question 5
becomes what are the environmental, political, and social implications of 
Colombia’s domestic drug policies? More specifically, what detrimental effects 
have manifested from the implementation of “Plan Colombia”, Colombia's most 
recent anti-drug initiative? !
!
Political Implications  !
Industry Effects on  Colombian Politics!!
! For decades the Colombian political system has been more vulnerable to the 
power of the illegal drug industry in comparison to the Colombian economy. 
Moreover, the illegal drug industry has had to develop and rely on the support of 
social and political networks in order to protect its investments, to prevent the 
government from jailing traffickers and extraditing them to the United States. 
According to Francisco E. Thoumi, extradition has been the main source of 
conflict between drug traffickers and the government. Drug traffickers have used 
all available resources to fight the extradition of their insurgency members. In 
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 Mauricio Solaún, "U.S. Interventions in Latin America: Plan Colombia," Program in 5
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, April 24, 2002, [Page 1], 
accessed November 29, 2014, http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/publication-
USInterventionsinLatinAmericaPlanColombia.html.
fact, during the late 1980s the conflict began to worsen because narco-terrorism 
erupted and many prominent politicians, including several presidential candidates 
were assassinated. Thoumi points out an example of how the drug industry has 
attempted to use politics to its advantage. “In the early 1980s, members of the 
Medellín cartel tried to obtain power directly and developed a strong support 
base, spending some of their wealth in public works. Pablo Escobar “bought” a 
politician and got himself elected to the Colombian Congress as a backup. Carlos 
Lehder established a small nationalist party that did not prosper. The Medellín 
cartel invested heavily in rural land and promoted the formation of self-protection 
paramilitary. The Medellín cartel did not hesitate to use violence against the 
public who opposed it or who simply tried to enforce laws as their duties required. 
The need to influence government policies also induced traffickers to develop 
links with politicians. Their wealth allowed them to make large political 
contributions. Not surprisingly, jointly with the large financial conglomerates, they 
became the main contributors to political campaigns.”  Moreover, the illegal drug 6
industry became the largest funding source for elections, and notably the industry 
contributed heavily to the 1982 election. Then in 1994, the Samper campaign 
received large amounts of funding from the drug industry. As a result, the Samper 
campaign became the main political and international issue that crippled the 
government and produced an unprecedented political crisis.  However, it is 7
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 Francisco E. Thoumi, "Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to 6
Social Crisis,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582 
(July 2002): [Page 111-12].
 Ibid,. 1127
important to understand the significance of Colombian politics in relation to the 
illegal drug industry. Although it may seem as if the illegal drug industry does 
benefit from Colombian politics, it does because the politicians indirectly help the 
cartels gain social recognition among the citizens.  As Thoumi mentioned many 
drug traffickers who contribute to Colombian politics use their political elites as a 
“joker” that they can pull out when needed for later. !
!
Geopolitics of Plan Colombia!!
! Many critics describe Plan Colombia as a United States authored and 
promoted policy directed toward militarily eliminating the Colombian guerrilla 
forces and repressing the rural peasant communities that support the ‘narco-
guerrilla’ forces. However, key policy makers in Washington are concerned with 
five key geopolitical issues. These issues, they argue, have the potential to 
adversely affect US imperial power in the region and beyond. First, the 
Colombian insurgency question becomes part of a geopolitical matrix that 
challenges and modifies US hegemony in northern South America and in the 
Panama Canal Zone. Second, oil production is indirectly affected by the 
geopolitics of Plan Colombia. For example, supply and prices are linked to the 
challenge in the region and beyond. Third, James Petras writes that core 
conflicts with the empire are found mainly in Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador 
(the radical triangle) but there is growing leftists and nationalist discontent in key 
adjoining countries, particularly in Brazil and Peru. Fourth, successful resistance 
in the radical triangle has already found an echo in countries farther south, such 
as Paraguay and Bolivia following the successful political struggles of Ecuador, 
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Venezuela, and Argentina. Last, the strength of the oil diplomacy and 
independent policy of Venezuela’s president Chaves has shattered the US 
strategy of isolating the Cuban revolution and further integrated Cuba into the 
regional economy. Moreover, Petras writes that “in more specific terms the 
conflict between the radical triangle and US imperial power focuses attention on 
the fact that much of what is described as ‘globalism' rests on the foundations of 
the social relations of production and the balance of class forces in the nation 
state. The recognition of this fact has particular relevance to the US-FARC 
conflict in Colombia. The assumption here is that without solid social, political 
and military foundations within the nation state, the imperial enterprise and its 
accompanying global networks are imperiled. Thus there is a need to look rather 
closely at the nature of its proxy war in Colombia in which Washington through its 
client regime attempts to destroy the guerrillas and decimate and demoralise 
their supporter in order to restore the local foundations of imperial power.” !8
!
II. PLAN COLOMBIA!!
Different Aims of Plan Colombia!
!
! As mentioned before, when it was initially developed, Plan Colombia had five 
main focuses: the economic strategy, the peace process, the anti-narcotic 
strategy, the strengthening of the state, and social development. The economic 
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 James Petras, "Geopolitics of Plan Colombia,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 8
52/53 (December/January 2000-2001): [Page 4618], Accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410105.
strategy was derived in hopes that the Colombian government could stabilize its 
economy by cleaning up its banking system and rebuilding its national budget.  9
Additionally, the Colombian government wanted employment to be generated by 
a mixed economy with an emphasis on the role of national and international 
private enterprise. However, even with increased tax reforms the indebted state 
did not have sufficient resources to implement an effective war on terrorism and 
drugs. The government insisted that the reduction of narcotic trafficking would 
increase the repatriation rate of illegal revenue generated from drug trafficking in 
the state. !10
! The second part of the plan focused on creating peace within the society. The 
explicit intentions of the peace process were for the government to establish 
internal sovereignty; achieve genuine acceptance of a democratic regime with 
peaceful contest for power; end human rights violence committed frequently by 
guerrilla groups; and eliminate guerrilla involvement in the narcotics business. 
The former president at the time, Andres Pastrana, met with the leader of the 
oldest guerrilla group in Colombia known as the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). 
Pastrana promised to negotiate a peace settlement with the guerrillas. Three 
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Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment,” In Briefing Paper Sixteen, [Page 3], Oxford, 
United Kingdom: The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, 2008, accessed 
December 3, 2014, http://reformdrugpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/
paper_16.pdf.
 Ricardo Rocha Garcia, "Drug Trafficking and its Impact on Colombia: An Economic 10
Overview,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 28, no. 55/56 
(2003): [Page 285].
months (November 1998) after the inauguration of Pastrana, in a violent 
offensive within which no cease-fire agreement occurred, the President declared 
an area of the country, most inhabited by the FARC, as a zone de distensión, a 
zone in which all armed and security forces were prohibited from entering. The 
purpose of this demilitarized zone was to guarantee the necessary security to 
negotiate a peace agreement before the end of the president’s term. However, in 
February 2002 the peace process ended because FARC violence continued to 
escalate.!
! Without a doubt, the economic difficulties of the state can be attributed to the 
increased illegal acts of the guerrillas. For instance, the guerrillas caused major 
businesses to become bankrupt because they committed a massive amount of 
kidnappings. Additionally, extant insecurity contracted investment levels, while at 
the same time oil pipeline sabotage reduced export levels. Also, the guerrilla 
groups targeted the state’s infrastructure by destroying electrical substations, 
transmission lines, bridges, aqueducts, and other various nation related pieces of 
infrastructure. Ultimately, the president aimed to obtain a cease-fire and a peace 
accord from the guerrillas with the intentions of transforming the guerrillas into 
political parties, forcing them to become unarmed participants in the 
democratization process.6 !11
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Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, April 24, 2002, [Page 4], 
accessed November 29, 2014, http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/publication-
USInterventionsinLatinAmericaPlanColombia.html.; Beatriz Acevedo, Dave Bewley-
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Briefing Paper Sixteen, [Page 7], Oxford, United Kingdom: The Beckley Foundation 
Drug Pol icy Programme, 2008, accessed December 3, 2014, ht tp: / /
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!  The third part of the plan focused on an anti-narcotic strategy. After the Cold 
War the U.S. government began to shift its attention to the security issues that 
were caused by the drug war in Latin America. The drug problem in Colombia 
was considered an international issue, not just a domestic issue, because the 
U.S. and other countries were subjected to the increased imports of illicit drugs 
and the increased percentages in drug users, specifically cocaine addicts. The 
United States was and still is the biggest consumer of the illegal drug production 
manifesting in Colombia. The aim of this strategy was to reduce the production of 
the drug industry by fifty percent within a time frame of five years. The strategy 
was broken up into three phases: each phase focused specifically on destroying 
the industry one area at a time throughout the state. The strategy aimed to halt 
the agriculture to consumption process by use of eradication of crops, aerial 
fumigation, and foreign aid to create alternative development programs to 
supplement the income of coca growers. !12
! The fourth part aimed to strengthen the state. In order for the government to 
establish a peaceful and successfully controlled society, the military, police, and 
judicial system had to be reformed and strengthened. The president adopted 
several programs to complete this goal, such as the Presidential Program 
Against Corruption in the public and private sectors, as well as the Program for 
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Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, April 24, 2002, [Page 3], 
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Taylor, and Coletta Youngers, "Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment,” In 
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Witnesses and Threatened Persons. Also the president hired a Commissioner for 
Human Rights. The aid gathered from the international community would also be 
used develop these initiates as well as provide training programs for law 
enforcement to battle narcotic expansion and violence associated with drug 
trafficking in the state. The president intended to use the military and the police to 
construct and maintain peace by modernizing and professionalizing the system. 
The goal of this strategy also consisted of obtaining more mobile forces that 
would be better trained to handle offensive operations. By making the military 
more career focused the president hoped to transfer the army into a voluntary 
corps that would have a more permanent place in society. Lastly, the United 
States would assist in the reorganization of the judicial processes by creating and 
training specialized enforcement units. !13
! Finally, the last part of the plan aimed to implement a social component in 
which assistance was sent to the municipal and community level for development 
of special grassroots programs. The Colombian government assumed that 
violence and corruption would eventually end with the increase in civil support for 
a better, more accountable and controlled local government. The grassroots 
programs served as a specific function that enabled the development of a 
tolerant democratic collective conscience. These grassroots groups would be 
 15
 Mauricio Solaún, "U.S. Interventions in Latin America: Plan Colombia," Program in 13
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, April 24, 2002, [Page 4], 
accessed November 29, 2014, http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/publication-
USInterventionsinLatinAmericaPlanColombia.html.; Beatriz Acevedo, Dave Bewley-
Taylor, and Coletta Youngers, "Ten Years of Plan Colombia: An Analytic Assessment,” In 
Briefing Paper Sixteen, [Page 7], Oxford, United Kingdom: The Beckley Foundation 
Drug Pol icy Programme, 2008, accessed December 3, 2014, ht tp: / /
reformdrugpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/paper_16.pdf.
responsible for the rebuilding of the nation’s infrastructure by carrying out several 
projects which included the building of roads and schools,  a health unit, water 
service, and other major projects. Through the social development process the 
Colombian government would implement eight programs: Families in Action; 
Employment in Action; Youth in Action; Roads for Peace; Countryside in Action; 
Humanitarian Attention; Humans Rights; and the Transparency and Peaceful 
Living Together program. The Families in Action program allowed families with 
the poorest economic status to obtain cash subsidies with the requirement that 
families had to adhere to health and education expectations.  The Employment in 
Action program provided employment for unskilled workers to build urban 
infrastructure. The Youth in Action was a program geared towards providing 
semi-skilled individuals between eighteen and twenty-five years with training and 
employment. This program was directed towards the seven cities with the highest 
unemployment rates. The Roads for Peace program targeted the construction 
and improvement 6,650 miles of roads in 260 counties, thus generating directly 
and indirectly about 105,00 jobs. The Countryside in Action program developed 
social and economic sustainable production projects to benefit small and middle-
sized agriculture producers. The Humanitarian Attention program addressed the 
needs of the victims of violent guerrilla attacks and those of the people who were 
displaced due to violent situations. As mentioned before, a Commissioner for 
Human Rights was hired in order to promote the continued development of a 
human rights culture. Lastly, the Transparency and Peaceful Living Together 
program aimed to provide legal property rights in areas were eradication pacts 
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were made to remove illegal crops. This program also supported the 
development of democracy in the public administration and citizen control over 
government and violence.  Given the above overview of what Plan Colombia did 14
it is relatively easy to examine the implications that can be drawn from the 
outcomes of the proposal.!
!
Different Methods to Seize Drug Trafficking!!
Aerial and Forced Eradication!!
! First, it is important to understand what is meant by aerial spraying. In 
Colombia, the aerial spraying of chemicals, specifically herbicides, occurs in 
order to cut off the supply of raw materials used to produce illegal substances. 
The aerial spraying of herbicides physically destroys the natural state of the 
plantations. However, successful interruption of the raw materials used for drug 
production only last about four months to a year. Moreover, aerial spraying does 
not permanently affect the production of raw drug materials, because four to 
twelve months is needed to regenerate crops that were partially destroyed or to 
plant new crops. Yet, policy makers fail to recognize the fact that forced 
eradication only raises the price of raw materials. Thus, farmers plant new sites 
in order to keep up with the high demand for production and processing. !
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! Among other issues, the eradication projects have had an environmental 
impact on the land and on the health of civilians. According to different studies 
the mixtures used in the aerial forced eradication project are considered harmful 
to the environment, especially to amphibians. Through follow up studies run by 
the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense it has been confirmed 
that the spray mixture killed fifty percent of the amphibians that were exposed to 
it within ninety-six hours. Moreover, it is important to note the negligence 
stemming from the involvement of the U.S. government. For example, the U.S. 
State Department has not provided adequate information about the location of 
and risk to sensitive water bodies that suffer adverse consequences from 
eradication. Additionally, the department has done nothing to address whether 
other species are likely to be harmed from aerial spraying. As said by Puentes, 
the AIDA’s Legal Director, “given the number of unanswered questions about the 
safety of the spraying, and considering the precautionary principle and the 
international obligation not to cause impacts to the territories of other States, the 
Colombian government should halt spraying immediately, and instead implement 
more effective and environmentally safe alternatives for coca eradication”. !15
!
Alternative Development Programs !!
! According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Colombia has the 
world’s largest and most successful national alternative development program. 
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The annual budget for the program is close to $85 million. These programs with 
the support of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime has helped more 
than 150,000 farmers switch from illicit crop cultivation to alternative livelihoods 
that have created more than about 150,000 jobs. Additionally through the 
national and international supermarket chain, sixty farm enterprises have 
switched to selling products worth $40 million, such as coffee, cocoa, palm 
hearts, chocolate, honey, and other legal cash crops. Mr. Yury Fedotov, the 
executive director of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, commented 
on the use of the alternative development programs by stating that “many of the 
alternative development models developed in Colombia are worthy of replication 
in other countries. I can only express my admiration for all of the local farmers 
who - with a lot of courage and conviction - have left behind the violence 
generated by coca bush cultivation to embrace a better future. We at UNODC 
are proud to be a part of this development.” !16
! In 2000, the United States Agency for International Development in Colombia 
developed an alternative development policy. Of the $869 million allocated for the 
counter-narcotics initiative, $42.5 million was distributed for the alternative 
development programs throughout the country. The main goal of the alternative 
development programs was to create legal income and employment 
 19
"Colombia: From Illicit Drugs to Sustainable Livelihoods," UNODC, last modified 16
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opportunities for small farmers through small projects.  Funding for farmers 17
would continue under the circumstances that farmers commitment to the 
eradication of their illicit crops and commitment to not plant illegal crops again in 
the future. It is important to note that the program has had three different phases. !
! In the first phase, which lasted from 2001 until 2004, a crop substitution 
model was used to create alternative employment opportunities baed on private-
sector investments. This model ran of the condition of ‘zero coca’ in the areas of 
intervention. For this phase of the policy Putumayo was used as a pilot city for 
the program and the city was accompanied by a military offense as part of 
helping eradicate drugs successfully. In the second phase, which lasted from 
2005 until 2008, the the United States Agency for International Development in 
Colombia decided to change its approach by moving from a focus on crop 
substitution to working with communities to create a culture of legal economic 
practices.  For instance, the programs were geared toward strengthening the 18
productive sector, building good governance and institutions, while at the same 
time maintaining the prior condition of ‘zero coca’ tolerance in intervention areas. 
According to Ricardo Vargas Meza of the United States Agency for International 
Development in Colombia, the “USAID’s concept of community as a social 
construct - involving processes of individualization and incorporation of private 
enterprise - did not reflect the structure and customs of traditional smallholder 
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communities in the intervention areas.” Lastly, the third and most recent phase, 
which lasted from 2009 until 2013, was a reformulation of the policy of phase 
two. !
!
National Development Plan!!
! The national development policy, entitled “Toward a Communal 
State” (2002-2006), was fully developed in 2002, during president Álvaro Uribe’s 
first term in office, with the idea that the internal armed conflict in Colombia was 
worsening, mainly because armed groups had access to resources from drug 
trafficking. Therefore, the national development policy was proposed as the fight 
against terrorists, drug trafficking, and transnationally organized crime groups. 
The focus of the national development plan consisted of a symbiosis between 
illicit crops and insurgency that directly affected the guerrilla groups’ power to 
control territory. Additionally, the policy forced on illicit crops and their relationship 
with the conflict because the drug problem was identified in the areas of 
production. By tackling the socio-economic issues behind illicit crop production 
the Colombian government is able to solve the growing security problem that 
stems from drug trafficking. Ricardo Vargas states that this emphasis on the plan 
“is very different from that of international cooperation agencies, which believe 
Alternative Development should focus on tackling problems caused by poverty 
and marginalisation in certain regions. This approach sees drugs control as a tool 
for promoting human development and the reduction of illicit crops as the result 
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of an integral development process.”  Moreover, the domestic drug policy 19
implemented during the president’s first term in office combined the use of 
dissuasive force with Alternative development programs. !
!
III.DETRIMENTAL IMPLICATIONS!
!
! When considering the effects of Plan Colombia many significant implications 
can be drawn from various literature. For example, according to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime the number of hectares occupied by coca 
decreased from 102,000 hectares (in 1998) to 78,000 (in 2006). However, in 
2007 the areas increased to 99,000 hectares. Despite the eradication of over 
800,000 hectares cultivation continues to increase. According to the U.S. coca 
cultivation increased from 136,200 hectares (in 2000) to 157,200 hectares (in 
2006) even as between 1999 and 2005 Plan Colombia has cost the United 
States about $10 billion. According to the UN, Colombia still produces about 60% 
of the world’s cocaine.  Plan Colombia was supposed to cut Colombian cocaine 20
production in half within ten years. Pineda and other authors have suggested that 
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levels of coca production have actually increased since the eradication program 
began. Also they suggest that the main focus should not be on the eradication of 
crops but it should be geared towards the processing and commercialization in 
the export market and the laundering of drug profits, because most of the big 
profits are in these areas. !21
!
Social Implications !!
Effects of Aerial Eradication on Education!!
! As mentioned before, the effects of aerial eradication on illicit crops are 
detrimental to the Colombian society. More specifically, illicit crop eradication has 
affected the education of children through internal displacement. According to 
Brandi James in Examining the Impact of Illicit Crop Eradication on Education in 
Colombia, Colombia’s society has been experiencing an increase in displaced 
people for over thirty years. More than three million Colombians have been 
displaced since 1985. As a result, Colombia has been recognized as the country 
with the largest internally displaced persons population, leading both Afghanistan 
and Syria.!
!!
 23
 James Petras, "Geopolitics of Plan Colombia,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 21
52/53 (December/January 2000-2001): [Page 4620], Accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4410105.; Carolina Pineda, "Plan Colombia: A Political, 
Economic, and Cultural Analysis of Coca and Poppy Eradication Projects in Putumayo, 
Colombia,” Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology 13, no. 1 
(June 21, 2011): [Page 75], Accessed November 13, 2014, http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=totem.
!
Internal Displacement!!
! Pursuing this further, scholars argue that many Colombians have been forced 
to seek refuge among the targeted guerrilla groups because Plan Colombia has 
caused adverse social issues, such as forced internal displacement, economic 
crisis, and food shortage. Also according to a Human Rights Watch on 
Colombian child soldiers, many youth have been forced to join guerrilla groups 
due to starvation. Caroline Pineda claims that the abandoned and impoverished 
areas in Colombia offer little viable economic alternatives and civilians, desperate 
for income, have moved further into the Amazon jungle or to the Pacific Coast in 
order to continue cultivation. In the same way Katrina Kosec in The Ones Who 
Preserve Our Identity: Women, Children and Plan Colombia, she states that 
“migration necessitated by food and work shortages, personal danger, or other 
actors has emptied entire indigenous territories”. Local indigenous leaders 
reported that vacating their communities was the only alternative response to the 
arterial spraying projects led by eradication efforts Graham. !22
!
Social Reactions and Responses!!
! In light of the above overview of conclusions drawn from the outcomes of 
Plan Colombia it is easier to understand how and why many Colombians have 
reacted to the adverse situation. According to CNN, Marta Lucia Ramirez, a 
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former Colombian minister of defense and one of the designers of the proposal, 
said that “the agreement has helped her country to strengthen democracy and 
government institutions. It has also increased the Colombian government’s ability 
to fight what she calls ‘narco-terrorism’…but the high drug demand in the U.S. 
makes it difficult to eradicate production at home.” She was also quoted saying 
that she “believe[s] that the American strategy against drugs is not enough. It’s 
probably a failure.”  Many others have also said that they believe that the 23
proposal is causing a balloon effect, in which coca producers are steadily moving 
from place to place. In some cases they are just relocating around Colombia and 
in others cases they are relocating to neighboring countries thereby causing 
border conflicts. Overall Colombia elites are unsatisfied with the outcomes of 
Plan Colombia. Additionally CNN reports that security experts say “Plan 
Colombia has improved security, but it has fallen short on its original goal of 
reducing drug production in the region. In what is known as the balloon effect, 
increased army attacks against drug traffickers in Colombia has moved coca and 
poppy crops elsewhere. And the quantity of the drug production from the Andean 
countries like Bolivia, Peru and Colombia is the same as 10 years ago”. !24
! Many Colombian elites have given negative responses to the adverse 
situation. However both governments have done a great job at ignoring the 
sentiments of the natives especially considering that more than 20 million 
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Colombians (45.5% of the pop.) live below the poverty line and 16.6% suffer from 
extreme poverty. Natives are appalled by the U.S and Colombian government’s 
attempt to provide an alternative supplement for the income received from 
trafficking cocaine. In other words, both governments attempted to provide 
alternative income opportunities other than those opportunities gained from 
trafficking cocaine. City officials, such as Manuel Alzate Restrepo, the mayor of 
Puerto Aziz, Southern Colombia believe that the U.S.-Colombian pact to provide 
alternative assistance is useless because 950 USD (2 Million Pesos) is not 
enough for a small family of five to live off of for a year compared to how much 
they would make if they cultivated coca leaves. With that said officials believe it 
will be impossible to stop farmers from cultivating because these farmers have 
large families to take care of. Additionally, natives are less willing to give up 
cultivation because of the lack of government implementation of newly developed 
pact proposition. !25
!
Environmental Implications!!
Health Issues!!
! The human health consequences of forced eradication have been extremely 
severe. According to Graham, Colombian physicians from areas that have been 
sprayed have observed an increase in respiratory, skin, and gastrointestinal 
illness from Colombians that have been exposed to the spray. Physicians also 
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observed other reactions attributable to spray exposure, such headaches, 
vomiting, fever, dizziness, and red eyes. In August of 2001 a European Human 
Rights Organization visited Colombia and was able to verify skin conditions, such 
as rashes and dry skin, in both children and adults who were directly exposed to 
the aerial spraying. They also concluded that these people were most likely 
directly exposed to the spraying while they worked on their land or played in their 
backyards. Interestingly, a Colombian health department also concluded that 
they had observed a number of cases in which patients were experiencing skin, 
respiratory, digestive, and ocular complications. Even worse, studies have found 
that Ecuadorian communities living near the Colombian borders have also 
suffered from the same illnesses as Colombian patients after having been 
exposed to spray during the aerial fumigations that occurred in that region. 
Besides physically affecting humans negatively, aerial spraying has also directly 
affected individuals’ livelihoods. For example, the aerial spraying has significantly 
contributed to the destruction and failure of legal crops. Local farmers have also 
witnessed the eradication of their banana, yucca, and corn crops. !26
! In 2002 a report titled “Report on Issues Related to the Eradication of Illicit 
Coca in Colombia was submitted to the United States Congress in light of the 
health issues caused by forced manual eradication and aerial eradication. 
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, in 2002 the 
United States Embassy received a complaint of multiple cases of poisoning from 
the spraying of coca plants in Colombia. Two hospitalized children were tested by 
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toxicologists in order to discover if the accusations were true. One child was 
found to be suffering from poisoning by an organophosphate insecticide.  This is 27
just an example of one in many cases in which Colombian natives have suffered 
from the consequences of coca eradication.  !
!
Landscape and Ecological Issues!!
 ! The spraying has had a detrimental effect on the landscape of Colombia. 
Studies have also shown that spraying has caused Colombia’s landscape to 
deteriorate. Aerial spraying has inflicted severe conditions on the terrain, such as 
soil infertility, blockage of vegetation regeneration, erosion, deforestation, 
desertification, and groundwater contamination. It has also interfered with the 
biological operations of the terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Furthermore it 
has contaminated many rivers. Fumigation processes have affected a number of 
species, such as earthworms, fungi, microbes, fish, birds, horses, cattle, poultry, 
dogs and other vital species. The adverse effects of the fumigation process can 
be felt throughout the jungle. Consequently, in efforts to avoid fumigation farmers 
have moved deeper into the rain forest thereby driving wildlife away. !28
! Additionally, Ricardo Vargas asserts that the second part to the eradication 
policy, the Supply Reduction Policy portion, is a complete failure and it promotes 
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crop displacement. He gives an example of efforts to eradicate illegal crops 
stating that “ at the time, the problem simply shifted from the lowlands to the 
highlands and, thus from a strategic consideration to an environmental one. It 
negatively affected the ecological balance in water-producing woodland areas, 
since new illicit crops were planted to replace those that had been eradicated.”  29
Moreover, a continuous cycle is manifested in which natural woods are cut down; 
marijuana or coca crops areas planted; forced eradication with the fumigation of 
herbicides occurs; migration to better preserved and harder to control areas in 
the zone’s middle thermic floors (middle level of Colombia’s ground surface); 
then the cycle continues again. !
! Continuing this further Vargas asserts that the first effect is deforestation, 
which in some cases shows a ratio of one hectare of cultivated coca equaling 
one and one half, and even two hectares, of slash and burn. The repositioning 
and spread of coca crops has meant the deforestation of between 152,700 to 
203,000 wooded hectares.  According to Vargas a technical paper was issued 30
by a consortium of Colombian enterprises directly and indirectly involved with the 
environment, in which four serious risks to the environment were laid out. 
However, it is important to note that tebuthiuron is a nonselective broad spectrum 
herbicide of the urea class. Vargas writes: !
!
 29
Ibid,. 15.29
 Ibid,. 28.30
1. The residual effect exerted by tebuthiuron’s high persistence can cause 
soil infertility and block the natural regeneration of vegetation for a 
prolonged period of time, favoring erosion and desertification processes at 
the core of the ecosystems exposed to it. !31
!
2.  Tebuthiuron’s nonselectivity affects the first link of the trophic chain 
constituted by vegetation (autotrophes), interfering, to different degrees, 
with the various links in the web of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, 
since plant death and the alteration of species variety causes a reduction 
in the availability of foodstuff and modifies niches and habitats. !32
!
3.   Tebuthiuron’s high mobility amplifies the area exposed to its effects, 
since it is transported via rainfall towards surface water or through 
leaching to groundwater. Severe precautionary measures are required, 
given that most of the areas in which the country’s groundwater aquifers 
are located have not yet been identified, nor has their degree of 
vulnerability been determined. !33
!
4. Considering the characteristics of the Amazonian edaphological  (is 
concerned with the influence of soils on living things, particularly plants) 
landscapes and taking into account the area’s precipitation (40mm to 
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50mm at a time), the rainfall intensity surpasses the soil’s seepage 
capacity. Therefore, a sheet of rainwater is formed, favoring the 
herbicide’s movement to areas outside those of application and in the 
direction of surface water, with subsequent damage to terrestrial and 
aquatic plants. !34
!
IV.COLOMBIA MOVING FORWARD!
!
! It is important to note that some progress has been made because the 
guerrilla groups, such as FARC have been weakened and operate with only half 
the strength with which it started out at the beginning of the proposal. Drug 
related violence and criminality has dramatically decreased and the Colombian 
state has been strengthened. This includes the transformation of the military, 
which has doubled in size. However, a lot of lives have been lost in the fight to 
decrease drug trafficking efforts across the Americas. In 2010, it was estimated 
that about 21,000 fighters from both sides and about 14,000 civilians have been 
killed. !35
!
!
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New Rural Development Plan!!
! As of August 2013, recently re-elected President Juan Manuel Santos has 
vowed to the Colombian people the restoration of land rights to those deserving 
individuals that consider themselves victims of the drug stricken conflict. The year 
2014 marked the end of Colombia’s national development plan, known as 
Prosperidad para Todos 2010-2014 (Prosperity for All). The plan was designed 
by President Juan Santos in order to reduce poverty, increase incomes, generate 
employment opportunities, improve security and ensure the sustainable use of 
natural resources through Colombia. More specifically, the plan sought to foster 
more sustainable economic growth, while at the same time promoting equal 
opportunities for all citizens without considerations of their ethnicity and social 
status. Ultimately the plan would have ended all violence and conflict associated 
with drugs in order to repair the social fabric of Colombia.  However, with the 36
rise of drug production in Colombia President Santos has had to develop a new 
plan to tackle the issue. However, in order to make this plan successful President 
Santos has come to a peaceful negotiation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) about a land reform agreement.!
! Once written up the agreement will be known as the Rural Development Plan, 
as it is the first step in bringing internal peace to the state of Colombia. The 
purpose of the project is to build the capacity of the institutions in order to 
administer and manage programs that restitute land to the victims of the drug 
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infused internal violence. Additionally, the programs will help extend land titling in 
prioritized or mostly undeveloped rural areas. Ultimately, the goal is to promote 
sustainable rural development that in turn will enable beneficiaries of land 
restorations to retain and make productive and efficient use of their new land. 
The plan is estimated to receive about $65,000,000 in funding.  The plan 37
extends to cover housing programs, the provision of tap water, technical 
assistance and training, access to education, formal land tilting, infrastructure, 
and soil recovery. The document states that the purpose of the agreement is to 
reverse the effects of the internal conflict and restore land to the victims of 
dispossession and forced displacement. !38
!
Conclusion!!
! Thus, the question becomes how exactly do we start the process to slow 
down the production of the drug market in Latin America. The obvious answer 
would be to provide sufficient assistance to the citizens who survive to enable 
them to support their families without participating in the production of drugs. 
However, the obvious answer is not necessarily a sufficient long term solution, 
especially when the drug market has strengthened and expanded over the past 
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twenty years. Given the above responses to Plan Colombia it is easier to 
understand why the environmental and social implications are considered to be 
adverse. In short, studies have found that the U.S. involvement in the Colombian 
drug war has had no effect on preventing or decreasing the levels of cocaine 
production throughout the Americas. In fact, it is also evident, as expressed in the 
Colombia citizens’ sentiments, that the involvement of the United States 
government in the Colombian drug industry, is considered negligent. Additionally, 
the plan has inflicted terrible effects on the Colombian society, such as 
displacement, destruction of ecosystems and landscapes, as well as different 
human health issues. Additionally, it has caused a balloon effect causing 
insurgencies to relocate through the state, and neighboring borderlands, 
ultimately causing corruption. With the displacement of farmers the insurgencies 
have to constantly relocate and recruit new farmers. Although it may sound 
unrealistic one solution to the drug problem would be for Colombia to 
decriminalize cocaine and other illicit drugs. Even though it is entirely illegal for 
the Colombian government to put on their blindfolds and ignore the situation, the 
government and especially the society would benefit from the revenue that could 
potentially be put back into the economy for more development. If the current 
polices that the Colombia and United States is applying to these issues do not 
solve the problem, then Colombia should follow by example and mirror the 
legalization politics adopted in Colorado and other U.S. states. It seems as if the 
state is benefitting economically from the legalization of marijuana and we can 
assume that violence has also decreased because the drug is widely available. !
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! In conclusion, many authors argue that coca production is not the driving 
force of contemporary Colombian guerrilla violence. Ultimately, they offer 
evidence that concludes that the relationship between coca production and 
violence is weak and data suggests that coca cultivation is not a major factor in 
explaining the differences in guerrilla groups’ levels of violence.  Moreover, 39
authors assert that evidence suggests that current U.S. foreign policies to 
apprehend the drug trafficking issue are counterproductive.  If trends suggest 40
that there is a positive relationship between coca production and guerrilla 
violence, why is the government worried about interfering? For instance, since 
the coca exports have increased in Colombia, guerrilla violence has decreased. If 
this is the case why does the Colombian government allow the U.S. to 
continuously be involved? About 50% of Colombians live in poverty and 60% are 
unemployed, with these numbers the Colombian government should be focusing 
their efforts on improving socioeconomic conditions for the society.  41
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